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inviolability of State immunities no less than those of the
National Govermhent, and, aside from their value from a
legal standpoint, serve.as protests against the view that ob-
tains in some quarters that the Court is inclined to overlook
the constitutional limitations that are of benefit to the Statem
Politically speaking, it could be wished that all the States
would, for themselves, by proper legislation, follow the ex-
ample set by the United States in establishing the Court of
Claims, and permit themselves to be sued. But so long as
the doctrine of State immunity from suit remains to any
extent part of our law, the profession will be able to advise
with some degree of satisfaction on the subject, now that
its definite meaning has been at length evolved in the dis-
cussions and conclusions of the Supreme Court.
A. H. WiNTERSTEEN.
Philadelphia.
A STRANGE DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has during all its existence en-
joyed the confidence and respect of the public to a remarkable degree,
and that confidence has been well deserved. Its decisions have been dis-
tinguished by great learning, careful investigation, and convincing rea-
soning. In almost all cases its judgments have met with immediate and
general approval; yet it must be admitted, and it is admitted by the
Court, that a mistake has sometimes occurred. The instances of mistake
have been marvelously rare. Considering how great has been the burden
imposed upon it, and the.broad jurisdiction committed to it by the Con-
stitution, it is a wonder that the Court has not much more frequently
fallen into error. But the infrequency of mistakes naturally invites
attention to one when it has been made, and especially when the conse-
quences of the mistake are far-reaching and hurtful. One such, it is be-
lieved, the Court has quite recently made. It was in the decision of the
case of Hans against the State of Louisiana (x89o), x34 U. S. i. The
facts of that case, stated so far as it is necessary to state them, in order to
exhibit what the Supreme Court has decided, were the following: Hans,
a citizen of Louisiana, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United
States against the State of Louisiana to *recover the amount of certain
coupons for interest, annexed to bonds of the State, issued under the pro-
visions of an act of the State Legislatuie, enacted in 1874. The bonds
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and coupons were made payable to bearer. They were held by the
plaintiffs; the coupons were past due and unpaid. By the act under
which they were issued, the State contracted and agreed to pay the inter-
est represented by the coupons semi-annually as the coupons matured.
But this was not all. A subsequent Amendment of the State Constitution
ordained as follows:
"The issue of said consolidated bonds, authorized by the General As-
sembly of 1874, at its regular session [the bonds above mentioned], is
hereby declared to create a valid contract between the State and each and
every holder of said bonds, which the State shall by no means and in no
wise impair. The said bonds shall be a valid obligation of the State in
favor of any holder thereof, and no court shall enjoin the payment of the
principal or interest thereof, or the levy and collection of the tax therefor.
To secure such levy, collection and payment, the judicial power shall be
exercised when necessary, The tax required for the payment of the
principal and interest of said bonds shall be assessed and collected each
and every year, until said bonds shall be paid principal and interest; and
the proceeds shall be paid by the Treasurer of the State to the holders of
said bonds-as theprincipal and interest shall fall due, and no further legis-
lation or appropriation shall be requisite for the said assessment and col-
lection, and for such payment from the'treasury."
It is impossible to conceive of a contract more thoroughly binding and
more solemnly ratified than the'contract of the State with the holders of
these bonds and coupons ; yet in 1879 the State, by a new Constitution,
ordained that the coupons of said bonds be and were thereby remitted,
and that any interest taxes collected to meet said coupons were thereby
transferred to defray the expenses of the State Government. By another
article of the new Constitution, the previous Constitution and all Amend-
ments thereto were declared to be superseded. All this was set forth in
the complaint of the plaintiff, and it was further averred that the State
claims that she is thus (by the operation of the last mentioned Ordinance),
relieved from her contract with the holders of the bonds and from pay-
ment of the coupons, and has prohibited her officers against making pay-
ment, and has diverted the taxes collected for the payment of the interest,
appropriating them to payment of the general expenses of the State.
The case of the plaintiff, therefor, as presented (so far as its subject
matter was concerned) was undeniably and confessedly within the juris-
diction of the courts of the United States. It presented a question aris-
ing under the National Constitution. The ordinance of the State Consti-
tution of 1879, was a plain violation of that provision of the National
Constitution which forbids a State to make any law impairing the obliga-
tion of a contract. The ordinance not only impaired the obligation the
State had assumed by her contract with the bond and coupon-holders, it
repudiated the obligation. This the State did not attempt to deny, or
even to justify. The defence set up in the Circuit Court was that the
State could not be sued without her permission. This defence the Circuit
Court sustained, and dismissed the case accordingly. It was then re-
moved to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of dismissal given by
.: 17A STRANGE DECISION.
the Circuit Court has recently been affirmed. What has thus been de-
cided is this-that a citizen of a State cannot sue the State of which he
is a citizen, in our United States Court, to recover a debt due to him by
the State, even though the case present a question arising under the Con-
stitution of the United States, unless the State has given her coiisent that.
she may be sued. It is a grave decision. If it is correct, very serious
consequences follow. Then that most important provision oftheNational -
Constitution, that no State shall make a law impairing the obligation of
contracts, is inoperative in many cases. Every State may make contracts,
and discharge herself at pleasure by a law of her own making. Thus the
Constitution fails'to secure one tf the great benefits which its framers had
in view, namely, the establishment of justice. That provision which pro-
hibits State legislation impairing contracts, was intended to prevent such
wrongs as are charged against the defendant State. Prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, great injustice had prevailed in many of the States.
Iws had been enacted totally changing existing contracts, and relieving
debtors from the obligations they had assumed. It was a crying evil, and
its existence was doubtless one of the causes that led to the formation
and adoption of the Constitution. The prohibition has often been en-
forced in the United States Court, and it has done much to promote anc%"
maintain justice. Can it be now that a State may disregard, it, so fir'as
her contracts are concerned, and that there is no remedy? Does not the
establishment of justice require that a State contract shall be maintained
iniolable, quite as much as that the contracts of a natural person shall be?
'Without further remarks in this line, and turning directly to the case-
under consideration, it is to be observed that the question before, the
Court was not whether a citizen of one State could sue another State.
In Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 2 Dallas (2'U. S.) 419, it was decided that
he could, as the Constitution then was, though the State had not con-
sented to be sued, and though the case presented no question arising un-
der the Constitution or laws of the United States. That was because the
Constitution expressly declared that the judicial power should extend to
controversies between a State and the citizens of another State. It was
not thought then that suits against a State were tacitly excepted. It was
in consequence of that decision that the Eleventh Amendment was.
adopted. That Amendment has no applicability to the case now under
consideration. It declares that the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit at law or equity commenced
or prosecuted against a State by "citizens of another State, or citizens or
subjects of a foreign State." It leaves carefully untouched suits brought
by I a citizen of a State against the State of which he is a citizen." This
omission cannot be regarded as accidental or unmeaning. It was doubt-
less the supposed indignity of being subjected to suits brought by citizens
of other States, or aliens that induced the proposal and adoption of this
Amendment. It is unnecessary to say more of this. The Supreme
Court does not. rely upon it to sustain their decision in the Hans case.
The sole ground upon which their opinion and judgment rest is, that no
suit of a private citizen can be sustained against a State in a United States
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Court in the absence of the State's consent, even though that person is a
citizen of that State, and though the suit presents a question arising under
the Constitution, or laws of the United States, or treaties. Is this ground
tenable? It is confidently believed it is not. True, as said by the Court,
it has often been laid down and acknowledged by the courts that a State
cannot be sued without her consent. But these rulings always apply to
suability in the State's own courts. It is admitted that a State cannot be
compelled to allow the use of its courts to a private suitor against'her.
Many of the States, however, do allow such suits. The United' States
does partially, and so do most other foreign governmentswhere the main-
tenance ofjustice is properly regarded. Moreover, the rule of denial of
use of a.State's courts by a suitor against a State has been derived flom
the usagei of independent sovereignties abroad, and it is claied as an at-
tribute of sovereignty. But the States, since the adoption of the Consti-
tution are sovereign only in a limited sense. The Constitution is the
supreme law ot the land, binding upon all the States, and controlling
considerable State legislation, or, rather, 'prohibiting it. As between
the United States and the States, the latter are only partially sovereign.
Their courts are in some cases subordinate. - If, however, it be conceded
that there is no difference in, this particular between the States and
wholly independent sovereignties abroad which do not allow themselves,
to be sued in their courts by their subjects, there are other points of dif-
ference which are believed to be substantial. The relation of a State to-
the General Government must be considered. As--already remarked, the
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. It is
the expression of the will of all the States, and all the legislators and
judges-in fact, all officers of the StAte make oath to support it.- The
second section of the third article of that instrument declares that "the.
judicial power" (of the United States) "shall extend to all cases in law
or equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States
and treaties made." It is noticeable that this deposit ofjudicial power is
.as comprehensive as language can make it. It is exceedingly broad. It
is all of it which has been conferred. There is no exception. It is not
said all cases arising under the Constitution and laws, except cases in
which a claim is prosecuted against a State. Nor is there anywhere in
the Constitution any grounds for an implication of a possible exception..
Judicial power is the right to try and adjudicate a case, and all cases
arising under the Constitution are declared to be subject to it. By the
first section of the third article that power is vested in United States
courts. How then it can be maintained that any power remains in a
State to determine whether' or not that power confided to United States
courts, shall be exercised, it is impossible to see. How can it be that a
State can enlarge or diminish, at its pleasure, the judicial power of the
General Government? How can it be that the United States may not use
its own courts without asking permission from any State? ,and use them
to sustain its own Constitution?
There is another view of the subject which is equally, if not more,
convincing. If it could be conceded that consent of a State is necessary
to enable the courts of the United States to try and adjudicate such a case
A STRANGE DECISION.
as is described in the second section of the third article -of the Constitu-
tion, above quoted, the question still remains whether the State has not
practically given consent by coming into the Union, and adopting the
Constitution. It is firmly believed she has. What does adopting the
Constitution mean, if not consent to all its provisions? How can it be
maintained that by their coming into the Union the States did not assent
to all the limitations which the Constitution imposed upon them, and to
the assumption and exercise of all the powers, judicial or other, which it
co erred upon the General Government. Is not this assent as perfect
an1 operative as if it had been given to each limitation and power in de-
tail? It ought not to be doubted. The Constitution ought to be con-
strued, if possible, so as to accomplish the great purposes for which it
was framed, one of which was to protect the inviolability of contracts
against adverse State legislation. For that, in part, United States Courts
were provided, and jurisdiction assigned to them. It cannot be that a
State, after having adopted the Constitution, and through its officers
sworn to support it, can relieve herself from the obligations it imposes,
by asserting that she never consented to have those obligations enforced
aga4nst herself. An act of a State Legislature authorizing suits to be
brought in United States Courts against the States would be a strange
anom4y. It has not hitherto been supposed that a State can enlarge or
retrain the jurisdiction of those Courts, because that jurisdiction is inde-
pendent of State control, made so by the sovereign power of the people
of the States. If what has been said is correct, the State of Louisiana
ha§ given an irrevocable consent that the Courts of the United States
shall have the power and right to try and adjudicate all cases, without
exception, arising under the Constitution and laws of the National Gov-
ernment, such as the case of Hans, even though she may not have con-
sented to be sued in the State courts. In their recent decision, the
Supreme Court seems to have overlooked the considerations now sug-
gested. This must be regarded as unfortunate, for if it is settled that be-
fore a suit against a State can be instituted in a United States Court, to
vindicate the Constitution (such a suit as that heretofore mentioned),
there must be a consent of the State above and beyond that which is im-
plied by the State's having come into the Union, one of the most valu-
able provisions of the Constitution is at the mercy of the State-the last
baitier against State repudiation is swept away, and the rankest injustice
is rendered easy and remediless.
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